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Metaphilosophy links #1

I’ve decided to create posts with links to recent metaphilosophy-related, non-peer-reviewed stuff I come across. Whenever I collect 7-8 items, there’ll be a new one. Enjoy. M. Arvan: Has philosophy made progress? C. Montiveros: How Philosophy Will Influence Technological Development. The best books on Philosophical Wonder, recommended by Eric Schwitzgebel. Interview by Nigel Warburton. The […]

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Williamson, Brock and others on philosophical progress

Recently on The Philosophers’ Cocoon there’s been an interesting discussion on the “no progress” accusation I mentioned in the previous post. It goes something like this: Take any major philosophical question you like. You’ll soon find out there are multiple theories, technical concepts and hair-splitting distinctions, dozens of arguments, replies to the arguments, replies to […]

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When does philosophy cease to be philosophy?

In The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell writes: Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and […]

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Intuitions as assumptions?

What I wrote about in the previous post is actually only a side issue in Tobia’s paper. His main point is that intuitions are used as evidence for and against philosophical theories, if “intuitions” are understood as “special kinds of philosophical assumptions, ones to which we are invited to assent that are suitable for argument […]

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Evidence for a theory vs evidence of a problem

According to the mainstream metaphilosophical view, intuitions – some sort of spontaneous, non-inferential judgments that just seem true – are used as evidence in philosophy. Philosophers are supposed to come up with thought experiments that “elicit” or “trigger” intuitions, and then rely on those intuitions when they argue for and against philosophical theories. For example, […]